INDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SOME EVIDENCE FROM A NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY PERSPECTIVE by Jörg MAYER


















INDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 



























Acknowledgement: This paper builds on work done by the author for Chapter 3 of UNCTAD￿s Trade and 
Development Report (TDR) 2002 and Chapter 5 of TDR 2003. The author is grateful to Marius Br￿lhart, Marco 
Fugazza, Richard Kozul-Wright, Rolf Traeger, and participants of the 27
th Annual Meeting of the International 
Economics Study Group in Bath for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Marco Fugazza kindly provided the 
distance data and the market access estimates used in section VI and Appendix 2. The opinions expressed are 





The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
UNCTAD. The designations and terminology employed are also those of the author. 
 
UNCTAD Discussion Papers are read anonymously by at least one referee, whose comments are taken into 
account before publication. 
 
Comments on this paper are invited and may be addressed to the author, c/o the Publications Assistant,* 
Macroeconomic and Development Policies, GDS, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. Copies of Discussion Papers may also 

















































Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
    I. INTRODUCTION  .......................................................................................................................... 1 
   II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS ...................................................... 2 
  II.1. The general framework of new economic geography models ...........................................  2 
  II.2. Trade in intermediate inputs and international production fragmentation .........................  4 
  II.3. The spread of industry from developed to developing countries .......................................  5 
  II.4. Trade liberalization and preferential trading arrangements ...............................................  7 
 III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES ............................................................................................. 9 
 IV. WORLD EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES AND WORLD MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED ............. 10 
   V. LOCATIONAL GINI COEFFICIENTS .............................................................................................. 13 
 VI. PERIPHERALITY AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION ............................................................................ 17 
VII. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................ 21 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................... 23 
APPENDIX 1   ..................................................................................................................................... 25 
APPENDIX 2   ..................................................................................................................................... 27 INDUSTRIALIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 









The paper draws broad predictions from the developmental elements of new economic geography 
models and subjects them to empirical scrutiny. Industrial activity has spread from developed to 
geographically close developing countries in sectors that are intensive in immobile primary 
factors and not too heavily dependent on linkages with other firms. Only developing countries with 
an already established industrial base achieved industrialization in other sectors. The sizable 
change in both the size and structure of manufactured exports from developing countries has not 
been associated with corresponding changes in manufacturing value added. To benefit more from 
relocating industrial activities, developing countries need to create the critical mass of linkages 





Changes in the sectoral composition of trade and production constitute a centrepiece in the structural 
transformation that accompanies economic development (see Syrquin (1988) for a survey). 
Differences in relative factor endowments, technology or policy regimes have traditionally been seen 
as determining differences in the pattern of economic activities across countries. Such explanations 
have recently been supplemented by contributions to the new economic geography, which emphasize 
mechanisms that lead to agglomeration of industrial activities in geographic space and show why even 
initially similar countries can develop very different production and trade structures. These models 
(e.g. Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999) formalize forward and backward linkages between 
industrial firms that had long been discussed by development economists (e.g. Hirschmann 1958) and 
show that firms benefit from being close to each other because of direct input-output linkages among 
them. 
 
In this framework, the current process of globalization ￿ in particular the decline in trade barriers and 
the growing role of intermediate inputs in world trade ￿ has a crucial effect on the geographical 
location of industrial activities. A decline in trade barriers below a certain threshold reduces linkages 
pulling towards agglomeration and strengthens forces related to relative endowments of immobile 
factors that pull towards a less concentrated distribution of industrial activities in geographic space. 
Thus, globalization tends to change the balance between dispersion and agglomeration forces and to 
favour the spread of industrial activities from developed to developing countries. However, this spread 
of industry is unlikely to be a smooth process and affects neither all developing countries nor all 
industrial sectors at the same time or to the same extent. In particular, the intensity of intermediate 
input use differs across industrial sectors so that rapid growth in world trade of intermediate 
production inputs may cause specialization trends in trade to differ from those in production. This 
raises important empirical questions as to the impact of the current wave of globalization on the 
development of countries￿ production and trade structures and on the geographic concentration of a 
particular economic activity. The main objective of this paper is to examine these questions with a 
focus on industrialization in developing countries.  
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Empirical studies on the relationship between trade, industrial location and development accompanied 
the theoretical work of Hirschmann (1958) and other early development economists and, indeed, were 
a prominent feature of the development literature in the 1950s and 1960s. By contrast, work in the area 
of the new economic geography has remained mostly theoretical. Given the focus of the major part of 
new economic geography models on the different fortunes of economies with similar underlying 
characteristics, there is little systematic empirical evidence on changes in locational patterns at the 
international scale, except for a number of studies that focus on the European Union or other member 
states of the OECD (for a survey see Overman et al. 2003). 
 
This paper goes beyond existing studies in a number of ways. First, it emphasizes the developmental 
elements of the new economic geography literature and draws broad predictions for empirical analysis 
from this framework. However, its main contribution is to the empirical literature as it supplements  
(i) empirical work of the early development literature on the relationship between trade, industrial 
location and development by looking at the more recent years that have been characterized by a strong 
decline in trade barriers, and (ii) empirical work within the new economic geography literature by 
basing the statistical and econometric analysis on a wide geographical coverage that includes countries 
at different levels of development, as well as by focusing on the difference in evolution of 
manufactured exports and manufacturing value added.
1 Finally, the paper estimates an empirical 
model on the centre-periphery dimension in sectoral location patterns for a sample that includes 
countries at different levels of development and on the basis of two different measures. 
 
The remainder of the paper is in six sections. Section II presents the theoretical setting and distils 
broad predictions regarding changes in the spatial distribution of manufactured exports and 
manufacturing value added. Section III concentrates on data and measurement issues. Section IV 
discusses aggregate evidence on changes in the distribution of world exports of manufactures and 
manufacturing value added during 1980￿2000. Section V examines locational Gini coefficients for 
countries and for manufacturing sectors. Section VI presents and estimates the empirical model on the 




II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS 
 
II.1. The general framework of new economic geography models 
 
What determines the structure of trade and production of an economy that is open to international 
trade and what impact does a decline in trade costs have on this structure when there are forward and 
backward linkages among industrial firms? Trade theory answers these questions by referring to the 
relationship between characteristics of countries and characteristics of goods. However, different trade 
theories include a more or a less wide range of factors in their definition of country and goods 
characteristics. 
 
Traditional Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory focuses on relative endowments of internationally 
immobile production factors across countries and on differences in factor intensities across goods. Set 
                                                      
1  Existing empirical work in the new economic geography literature that examines both developed and 
developing countries has a more limited focus. Hanson (1996, 1997) only looks at the United States and Mexico, 
Redding and Venables (2004a) concentrate on the cross-country distribution of income, and Redding and 
Venables (2004b) only look at countries￿ export performance.  
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in the general framework of a competitive market structure, which implies constant returns of scale at 
the firm level, the theory predicts that an economy exports goods whose production uses intensively 
the factor with which the country is comparatively well endowed and imports the other goods. 
Differences in countries￿ relative factor abundance also determine the extent to which industrial 
activities are spread across the global economy or concentrated in just a few countries. H-O does not 
consider forward and backward linkages, which are of no importance in a world of perfect 
competition. While fully applying only in a world of costless trade, the theoretical framework implies 
that a decline in trade costs leads to increased specialization of countries in sectors of relative factor 
abundance. 
 
The new trade theory provides a systematic treatment of increasing returns to scale at the firm level 
and imperfectly competitive market structures. Regarding the pattern of trade, new trade models give a 
theoretical explanation of how market size can provide a basis for comparative advantage. Building on 
this insight, the new economic geography models focus on pecuniary externalities that occur in 
increasing returns to scale industrial sectors and are created by the existence of forward and backward 
linkages ￿ manufacturing firms use both primary factors and other manufactures as production inputs 
and sell their output to both consumers and other manufacturing firms ￿ and make firms decide to 
locate close to other firms that supply some of their inputs and provide some of their markets. 
 
The new economic geography models predict that firms in increasing returns to scale industries that 
face positive trade costs will tend to locate in a large market. As shown by Krugman and Venables 
(1995), this is (i) because of forward (cost) linkages ￿ having more firms in a location means more 
competition and implies that more intermediate inputs are available locally and that these intermediate 
inputs tend to be cheaper than elsewhere allowing downstream firms to produce more efficiently and 
enjoy higher short-run profits, and (ii) because of backward (demand) linkages ￿ having more firms in 
a location enlarges the market for intermediate goods, allowing upstream firms to produce at a more 
efficient scale and raise short-run profitability ￿ in order to save trade costs. As a result, economies 
with large markets will get a disproportionally large share of increasing return activities. However, 
forces related to product and factor market competition work in the opposite direction, i.e. towards a 
dispersion of industrial activity. This is because the presence of a large number of firms will tend to 
drive wages up and output prices down, thereby lowering the short-term profitability of firms. Tension 
between forward and backward linkages on the one and product and factor market competition on the 
other hand determines the degree to which industrial activity is characterized by agglomeration or 
dispersion. The result of this tension on industrial location is likely to be non-monotonic. ￿At high 
trade costs, the dominant force in determining location is the need to be close to final consumption, 
preventing any strong geographical concentration of manufacturing. At low trade costs, the dominant 
determinant of location is wage costs, again mandating dispersed manufacturing to keep labor costs 
down. Therefore the linkage forces that can cause agglomeration are strongest relative to other forces 
at intermediate values of trade costs￿ (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999:258￿259). 
 
Accordingly, in new economic geography models, the structure of production in individual countries 
is determined, as in traditional trade theory, by the interaction between country characteristics and 
industry characteristics. But while traditional trade theory focuses on relative factor endowments of 
countries and factor intensities of goods, the mechanisms of new economic geography models also 
take account of market size and countries￿ geographical distance from the markets of main developed 
countries, as well as of transport intensity of industrial sectors, including the size of transport costs and 
the dependence on intermediate inputs.  
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What does this imply for the evolution of industrial structure in developed and developing countries as 
globalization forces gain strength? As Puga (1999:305) points out ￿the reliance on very special ￿ and 
sometimes opposite ￿ assumptions makes ￿ [the new economic geography] literature appear as a 
collection of special cases; and it is not always clear what each case buys, nor how they relate to each 
other. Furthermore, as the models have become more complex they have also relied increasingly on 
numerical methods, making comparisons even more difficult.￿ Consequently, there is no unified 
theoretical model with a consistent set of assumptions that could be applied to test a set of specific 
empirical predictions regarding the evolution of countries￿ industrial structure and trade patterns.
2 
 
While keeping the absence of a unified theoretical model in mind as a caveat for the interpretation of 
the empirical findings, a number of general predictions can be distilled from this literature regarding 
development issues. These broad predictions can be based on an analysis of how specific exogenous 
changes impact on the balance between forces that pull towards agglomeration and those that pull 
towards dispersion. Cost and demand linkages between industries pull towards agglomeration, while 
cross-country differences in the endowment of immobile production factors, the cost of trade between 
countries, and the strength of final consumer demand in locations other than the industrial centre pull 
towards dispersion. The remainder of this section discusses (i) the change in balance between 
agglomeration and dispersion brought about by the decline in communication and transport costs and 
the resulting increased tradability of intermediate production inputs that has given rise to international 
production fragmentation, (ii) how these changes might have impacted on the spread of industrial 
activities from developed to developing countries, and (iii) how trade liberalization and preferential 
trade arrangements, whose importance in the world trading system has risen strongly over the past few 
years, might have influenced the spread of industry in addition to the decline in communication and 
transport costs. All three subsections distil broad predictions on the evolution of manufactured exports 
and manufacturing value added that the following sections subject to empirical scrutiny. 
 
II.2. Trade in intermediate inputs and international production fragmentation 
 
The decline in communication and transport costs over the past few years has made it economically 
viable to break up integrated production processes and undertake downstream production activities in 
one country, and upstream production activities in another (see, for example, Jones and Kierzkowski 
2001). The optimal location of industrial activities is likely to change when this kind of production 
fragmentation occurs in industrial sectors with increasing returns to scale at the firm level because 
transport and communication costs on intermediate goods determine where pecuniary externalities 
occur. The new balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces is then determined by the degree 
to which final goods production relies on intermediate goods inputs, the relative factor intensities of 
upstream and downstream production, whether or not transport and communication costs also decline 
for final goods, and where final output is consumed. 
 
Following Venables (1996 and 1998), this mechanism can be described as follows: if there is variation 
in factor intensity across production stages and the downstream activity (e.g. assembly) is more labour 
intensive than the upstream activity (including the provision of product designs and process 
technology, and the production of intermediate goods) but trade costs (i.e. transport and 
communication costs, tariffs, non-tariff barriers, etc.) fall only for the upstream product, the 
downstream activity moves from the developed to the developing country, while the upstream activity 
                                                      
2 For reviews of the new economic geography models see Ottaviano and Puga (1998), Henderson et al. (2001) 
and Neary (2001) of which, however, only brief sections in the first two reviews address development issues.  
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remains in the developed country. The reason for this is that a decline in trade costs makes firms less 
sensitive to the pecuniary externalities created by forward linkages and more sensitive to international 
differences in factor prices. The level of final goods production activities in the developing country 
depends on the costs of shipping the final good. If these are high, final goods production in the 
developing country will become more profitable because of the availability of cheaper production 
inputs, but not rise above the amount sufficient to supply the developing country market, while the 
developed country will retain final goods production to supply its domestic market. Taken together 
this means that the developed country produces all intermediate goods, while the developed and the 
developing country share final goods production. 
 
If trading costs for the final good also fall below a certain threshold, final goods production in the 
developing country will increase.
3 This is because final goods producing firms in the developed 
country will find shipping the intermediate good to the developing country and the final good back 
home more profitable than producing both the intermediate and the final good at home. On the other 
hand, a decline in trade costs for the final good will make final goods imports from the developed 
country cheaper and raise competition for final goods producers in the developing countries, reducing 
their profitability. The outcome for final goods producing firms in the developing country will be more 
favourable the higher is the share of imported intermediate goods in the production of the final good 
and the larger is the market for the final good in the developing country. By contrast, if final goods 
demand in the developing country is small, the cost saving effect of fragmentation must be very high 
in order to make up for shipping the intermediate good from the developed to the developing country 
and the final good back to the developed country. In other words, the wage difference between the two 
countries must be high and/or trade costs must be very low, for example, because of close 
geographical proximity between the developed and the developing country, for international 
production fragmentation to occur. 
 
The resulting broad empirical predictions are: 
 
•  A strong rise of exports from both developed and developing countries in sectors where 
production stages are easily separable, components are less labour-intensive than final goods, and 
demand for final goods is small in the low-wage (i.e. developing) country; 
•  Manufactured exports grow more rapidly in developing than in developed countries; 
•  Manufacturing value added declines in developed and rises in developing countries but the bulk of 
manufacturing value added remains in developed countries; 
•  Manufactured exports in developing countries grow much more rapidly than manufacturing value 
added. 
 
II.3. The spread of industry from developed to developing countries 
 
According to new economic geography models, economic development is not a smooth process of 
many developing countries catching up with the industrialized countries. Rather, starting from a 
situation where a rich and a poor group of countries coexist, the models outline mechanisms that make 
industrialization spread in waves from country to country causing a few countries to make a rapid 
transition from the poor to the rich club (Puga and Venables 1996 and 1999; Puga 1999; see also 
Amiti 1998). As outlined above, these mechanisms work on the basis of the interplay between 
pecuniary externalities and trade costs but with a crucial role also for differences in wages between the 
                                                      
3 Amiti (2003) discusses a similar case.  
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industrialized and the developing countries. Agglomeration of industrial activities in a developed 
country becomes less sustainable the larger is the wage gap with the developing country, the lower are 
trade costs between the developed and developing country, the lower are forward linkages (because of 
a low degree of intermediate input use in final good production) and backward linkages (the benefit 
from being close to industrial consumers) in the developed country, and the higher are forward and 
backward linkages in the developing country. 
 
Initially, the industrialized countries have higher wages than the developing countries but the positive 
pecuniary externalities created by linkages among industrial firms compensate for the higher wage 
costs. The spread of industry is triggered by an exogenous increase in world demand for manufactures, 
relative to demand for other tradable goods, which increases demand for labour in the established 
industrialized countries and opens up a larger and larger wage gap between the industrialized and the 
other countries. At some point the wage gap becomes too large to be compensated by the benefits 
coming from linkages in the industrialized country, and industrial firms start to relocate to low-wage 
economies. 
 
However, the dispersion of industry does not lead to steady industrial development in all low-wage 
economies. Very small initial cross-country differences will determine which of the low-wage 
countries attract relocating firms ￿ if all countries are identical, it will simply be a matter of chance. As 
succinctly put by Henderson et al. (2001:86): ￿The pertinent dimensions of difference are those which 
determine the profitability of the first firms to relocate, so include labour market factors, internal 
infrastructure ￿, as well as institutional characteristics of a country. Since the first entrants will be 
highly dependent on imported intermediate and capital goods and on export markets for final sales, 
they will tend to go to locations close (or with good transport links) to established centres. ￿ The first 
sectors to become detached from an existing agglomeration will typically be those that are intensive in 
immobile primary factors (the prices of which are high in the centre), and that are not too heavily 
dependent on linkages with other firms. These may be firms with low usage of intermediate goods, 
low levels of sales to other industrial sectors, or that do not need to cluster with related activities to 
gain new technology. As these sectors relocate, so they may begin to create linkages and attract other 
sectors. The sequence in which industries enter then depends on their factor intensities, their 
tradability, and the way in which they benefit from linkages to other activities, and create their own 
linkage effects.￿ 
 
The importance given to differences in wages across countries and differences in factor intensity and 
intermediate input use across industrial sectors departs from the standard new economic geography 
models that focus on two countries with similar underlying characteristics and on the industrial sector 
as a whole. This allows for the formulation of predictions that can be tested empirically for a sample 
that includes different industrial sectors and countries with different underlying characteristics. 
 
However, the spread of industry will follow the path outlined in the preceding paragraphs only if 
initially linkages do not exceed a critical mass in any developing economy. If this is the case, firms 
looking for lower prices of immobile factors will move industrial activity earlier than firms looking to 
exploit linkages in the developing country who will move industrial activity only after the creation of 
sizable linkage effects in developing countries. By contrast, if there is a developing country that has 
the critical mass of domestic linkages already before the spread of industry sets in, both types of firms 
move industrial activity at the same time but to different developing countries: firms primarily wanting 
to exploit factor price differences will go to the developing countries with few linkages and among  
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them to those that are geographically close, while firms primarily looking to benefit from linkages in 
the new location will go to the already relatively more industrialized developing country with 
geographical proximity playing a secondary role. 
 
The impact on the developing country￿s structures of manufactured exports and manufacturing value 
added depends on the type of firm that moves industrial activity. If the developing country does not 
have a critical mass of linkages that provide pecuniary externalities to industrial firms because of 
insufficient domestic production of intermediate inputs or insufficient domestic demand from either 
other industrial firms or final consumers, the developing country will import a large fraction of 
production inputs and export the bulk of output without much domestic value added. As a result, the 
country￿s manufactured exports will strongly rise, while manufacturing value added will go up only 
little. By contrast, a developing country with established domestic linkages will provide a large share 
of intermediate inputs from domestic production and a large share of output will go into further 
domestic production or consumption. As a result, the country￿s manufactured exports will rise much 
less, while its manufactured value added will rise much more than in the first case. 
 
The resulting broad empirical predictions on the spread of industry are: 
 
•  Developing countries geographically close to a main developed country market benefit from 
industrial dispersion in labour-intensive sectors earlier than others provided that non-tradable 
goods and immobile factors are readily available; 
•  If all developing countries have a low level of wages and linkages, the spread of industry will 
differ in time with early movers looking for both close geographic proximity and lower prices 
of immobile factors relative to more industrialized countries, and later movers (after a critical 
mass of firms is created in some sectors) looking to exploit newly created linkages in the 
economically less developed regions. If developing countries differ regarding the level of 
wages and linkages, firms with different underlying motivations will move industrial activity 
at the same time with firms primarily looking for lower prices of immobile factors moving 
activity to the geographically close and relatively less industrialized developing countries, and 
firms looking to exploit linkages in the new location moving activity to the relatively more 
industrialized developing countries. The spread of industry from firms looking to exploit 
linkages will lead to a strong change in the developing country￿s manufacturing value added 
and a small change in its manufactured exports, while the opposite holds when the other firms 
move. 
 
II.4. Trade liberalization and preferential trading arrangements 
 
The characteristics of an individual country￿s external trading regime strongly influence the country-
specific effects of shifts in the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces discussed above. 
This is because trade barriers (such as tariffs and non-tariff measures) are essentially just another form 
of trade costs, which come in addition to communications and transport costs. Accordingly, the forces 
triggered by trade liberalization and preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) are very similar to those 
coming from a decline in transport and communication costs. The main additional feature of trade 
barriers is the possibility of discriminatory policies favouring one country over another. Therefore, the 
following discussion of the mechanisms features two developing countries, in addition to one 
developed country, in order to emphasize the effects of discriminatory trade policy. Following Puga 
and Venables (1997, 1998), two cases without discrimination (multilateral and unilateral trade  
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liberalization) and two cases with discrimination (PTAs between the developed and one of the 
developing countries, and PTAs among the two developing countries) are considered. 
 
Multilateral trade liberalization leads to an equal decline in the trade barriers on both the intermediate 
and the final good in all three countries and has the same effects as a decrease in transport and 
communication costs for the two goods, as discussed above. Unilateral trade liberalization for the 
intermediate good in one of the developing countries has the same effect as a decline in transport costs 
for the intermediate good. The effects of unilateral trade liberalization by one of the developing 
countries for both the intermediate and the final good are less clear because cheaper intermediate 
goods imports decrease production costs for final goods producers in the liberalizing country, while 
cheaper final goods imports decrease their domestic sales. Given only unilateral trade liberalization, 
this decline in profitability cannot be compensated by higher exports. Indeed, as pointed out by Puga 
and Venables (1998:231): ￿Under unilateral liberalization the continuing barriers to developing 
countries￿ exports mean both that it takes a lower tariff rate to start industrialization [in developing 
countries] and that, once industrialization has started, ￿ [the developing country] has a lower share of 
manufacturing than it would in the multilateral case.￿ 
 
When the two developing countries engage in a PTA with each other, industrial activity rises if the 
enlargement effect from combining the size of the two markets is sufficient to create additional 
pecuniary externalities for firms through either rising demand or falling costs. If PTAs between 
developing countries lower restrictions on the movement of labour, labour migration between the two 
developing countries can cause such a decline in costs by enlarging the pool of workers required by 
firms. When the developed and one of the developing countries form a PTA, the effects for the two 
countries are essentially the same as in the case of multilateral trade liberalization. By contrast, the 
other developing country will be relatively worse off because it will not attract additional industrial 
activities and lose market shares for its industrial exports in the developed country market. 
 
The resulting broad empirical predictions on the spread of industry that weaken or reinforce the pure 
geographical effects, which were discussed in the last section, are: 
 
•  Industrial activity moves most in sectors where trade barriers on intermediate goods are low in 
developing countries or where trade barriers on final goods are low in developed countries ￿ these 
are likely to be sectors where international production fragmentation has played an increasingly 
important role, i.e. wearing apparel
4 (Gereffi 1999), electrical and non-electrical machinery (Ernst 
and Ravenhill 1999), and transport equipment (Spatz and Nunnenkamp 2002); 
•  Industrial activity in developing countries rises more in sectors favoured by preferential trading 
arrangements among developing countries provided that the market enlargement creates additional 
pecuniary externalities for industrial firms; 
•  Under preferential trading arrangements between a developed and a developing country, the 
developing country that is part of the arrangement attracts more industrial activity than excluded 
developing countries, provided that differences in the geographical distance and/or the wage level 
and/or the excluded developing country￿s market size do not outweigh the effects coming from 
discriminatory trade policy. Empirical scrutiny of this prediction requires an examination of 
sector-specific data on effectively applied tariffs and on bilateral trade that is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
                                                      
4 Tariff escalation and tariff peaks are a prominent feature of trade barriers in apparel trade in general, but 
import-weighted actually applied tariffs on clothing and footwear in PTAs are relatively low (Mayer 2004,  
table 5).  
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III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
 
Most empirical papers that address the spatial dispersion of industrial activities at an international 
level are based on trade data either to analyse the pattern of trade flows itself or to use trade data as an 
indicator of specialization patterns in production. Trade data have the advantage of being relatively 
reliable and easily available at highly disaggregated levels for a wide range of countries. However, 
trade data are only an indirect measure of the underlying production changes. In order to measure 
specialization patterns on the basis of production data, it is possible to opt for employment, output or 
value-added data but value-added is probably the most precise measure of the size of an industrial 
sector and of specialization in production, as well as the measure most closely related to income and 
hence development. 
 
Nicita and Olarreaga (2001) provide a database that covers a wide range of countries and includes both 
trade and value-added data for a consistently defined set of industrial sectors. The analysis of sections 
V￿VII of this paper draws on this dataset and covers a sample of 34 countries and 22 industrial sectors 
for the period 1980￿1998 (see Appendix 1). 
 
A potential problem of the dataset is that some sector-specific data are not available for all of the 34 
countries (see Appendix 1 for detail). However, these missing values usually concern sectors of 
comparatively little importance, such as pottery and glass products, or countries whose production and 
export activities are of comparatively little importance in a specific sector, such as Costa Rica in iron 
and steel. The main exception to this is the lack of data for China regarding wearing apparel and 
footwear. This implies that the sectoral analysis for wearing apparel and footwear refers to only 33 of 
the 34 countries in the sample. Regarding the other sectors, data are often unavailable for several years 
either for the beginning or the end of the sample period. This means that it is not possible to 
intrapolate the missing data and that extrapolating the missing data is fraught with great uncertainty. 
The approach adopted was not to fill the gap but, given the interest in comparing development in 
exports with developments in value added, to make the dataset on exports compatible with the dataset 
on value added. Should these data gaps, nonetheless, be important, they are likely to bias observed 
specialization in favour of a discontinuation of previous or later trends. 
 
Turning to measurements issues, changes in the spatial distribution of economic activity in the world 
economy can be analysed on the basis of changes in the shares of countries or economic sectors in 
world totals or on the basis of changes in locational Gini indices, i.e. the indicator that, following 
Krugman (1991), has become the standard measure of the spatial dispersion of industry (see Amiti 
1999, for discussion). The following section focuses on changes in shares to analyse general 
developments in manufacturing activities, while the analysis in sections V and VI uses locational Gini 
coefficients. 
 
Locational Gini coefficients can be calculated for countries or for sectors and are based on a modified 
version of the Balassa index. To calculate sector-specific locational Gini coefficients, the Balassa 
index can be rewritten as 
 
Bij = (qij/qi) / (qj/Q) 
 
where qij is industry i value added in country j, qi is total industry i value added in the 34-country 
sample, qj is total manufacturing value added in country j, and Q is total manufacturing value added in 
the 34-country sample. The Balassa index, then, needs to be ranked in descending order plotting the  
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cumulative of the numeraire on the vertical axis against the cumulative of the denominator on the 
horizontal axis to get the Lorenz curve. The Gini coefficient corresponds to twice the area between a 
45-degree line and the Lorenz curve. The coefficient varies between zero and one where values closer 
to unity indicate higher degrees of concentration. To calculate country-specific Gini coefficients, the 
Balassa index needs to be rewritten as 
 
Bij = (qij/qj) / (qi/Q) 
 
and aggregated across countries instead of across industries, with the remaining steps as explained 
above. The development of specialization patterns over time can be measured by the growth rate of the 
Gini coefficients calculated by regressing the log of each Gini coefficient on a linear time trend. 
 
Locational Gini coefficients indicate the degree of specialization but are silent on the ordering of 
industries along the specialization spectrum. Thus, to complete the picture on specialization patterns, 
Krugman (1991) suggests using an index that captures the similarity of industrial specialization 







H HF − =∑  
 
where H and F denote the two countries, i refers to sectors, and s is the share of a particular sector in 
total exports of manufactures or in total manufacturing value added in that country. This measure 
calculates the absolute value of the difference in sectoral shares and varies between zero and two; a 
value of zero indicates identical sector compositions of the two economies, and a value of two 
indicates complete dissimilarity of sectoral structures. 
 
 
IV. WORLD EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES AND WORLD MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED 
 
This section addresses the predictions that following the decline in trade barriers and the rise in 
importance of intermediate production inputs in world exports associated with international production 
fragmentation: (i) manufactured exports have grown more rapidly in developing than in developed 
countries, (ii) manufacturing value added has declined in developed and risen in developing countries 
but the bulk of manufacturing value added has remained in developed countries, and (iii) 
manufactured exports in developing countries have grown much more rapidly than manufacturing 
value added. 
 
The examination draws on statistics on the share of different country groups and individual countries 
in world exports of manufactures and world manufacturing value added. One part of these statistics 
relies on a variety of sources that present aggregate data, while the other part of the statistics refer to 
the Nicita and Olarreaga (2001) dataset that will be used also for the disaggregated analysis in the 
following two sections. Comparing the results from the different data sources helps to assess to what 
extent the 34-country sample confers a representative picture of the world. The four columns on the 
left-hand side of table 1 compare the share of different country groups and individual economies in 
world exports of manufactures with their share in world manufacturing value added in 1980 and 2000. 
The export data refer to the definition of manufactures used in the Standard International Trade 






Share of selected regional groups and developing economies in world exports of 
manufactures and manufacturing value added, 1980￿2000 
(Percentage share) 
World    Sample of 34 countries   





Share in exports 




Region/economy  1980 2000    1980  2000  1980 1998      1980  1998 
Developed countries  82.3   67.7 64.5 72.4 90.4 76.0    90.1   87.7  
Core developed countries  69.4   49.4 n.a. 62.9 75.7 61.5    80.5   79.7  
    France  8.2    5.3 6.6 3.6 8.9 6.7      6.7    4.8  
    Germany  16.3    9.9 n.a. 6.8 17.4 13.1    11.4   11.8  
    Italy  6.6    4.6 5.2 3.5 7.1 6.0      4.5    2.8  
    Japan  12.4    9.6 12.8 17.4 13.3 10.2      15.4    16.3  
    Netherlands  3.7    2.7 1.3 1.1
c 4.0 3.2      1.2    0.8  
    United Kingdom  8.3    4.9 5.2 4.0 8.6 6.4      7.1    4.3  
    United States  14.0    12.6 24.3 26.5 16.4 15.9    34.2   38.9  
European periphery  2.5   3.9 n.a. 2.8 2.8 4.6    2.9   2.6  
    Greece  0.2    0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2    0.2   0.2  
    Ireland  0.5    1.4 n.a. 0.5 0.5 1.5      0.2    0.6  
    Portugal  0.3    0.4 n.a. 0.3
c 0.4 0.6      0.2    0.3  
    Spain  1.5    1.9 n.a. 1.8
c 1.6 2.4      2.2    1.6  
Developing countries  10.6   29.5 16.6 24.5 8.3 22.8    8.6   11.6  
Latin America  1.5   4.3 7.1 6.2 0.6 3.2    1.6   1.4  
   Argentina  0.2    0.2 0.9 0.8 n.a. n.a.      n.a.    n.a.  
   Brazil  0.7    0.7 2.9 1.4 n.a. n.a.      n.a.    n.a.  
   Mexico  0.2    3.0 1.9 1.8 0.4 2.8      0.5    0.6  
South and East Asia  6.0 
a 19.1 7.3 15.4 7.7 19.1      3.5    9.6  
   NIEs  5.1    9.4 1.7 4.6 6.0 10.1      2.0    5.5  
      Hong Kong (China)  0.2    0.5 0.3 0.2 1.5 1.3      0.4    0.2  
      Republic of Korea  1.4    3.3 0.7 2.4 1.7 3.2      0.8    3.3  
      Singapore  0.9    2.5 0.1 0.4 0.9 2.6      0.2    0.5  
      Taiwan Province of China  1.6   3.0 0.6 1.6
d 1.9 3.0      0.6    1.5  
   ASEAN-4  0.6    4.3 1.2 2.1 0.5 2.4      0.3    0.6  
      Indonesia  0.1    0.8 0.4 0.7 n.a. n.a.      n.a.    n.a.  
      Malaysia  0.2    1.7 0.2 0.5 0.3 1.6      0.1    0.4  
      Philippines  0.1    0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.7      0.2    0.2  
      Thailand  0.2    1.1 0.3 0.7 n.a. n.a.      n.a.    n.a.  
   China  1.1 
b 4.7 3.3 6.2 0.7 5.9     0.6   2.8  
            Countries in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union  7.1   2.8 18.9 3.1 1.3 1.2    1.3   0.6  
Source: Data in columns (1) and (2) are from the United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, data in columns (3) and (4) 
for the aggregates of developed countries, developing countries, Latin America, South and East Asia, and countries in 
Eastern Europe, as well as the data for China, are from the UNIDO International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics
table 1.1, while the other individual country data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators table 4.3. 
The data for columns (5)￿(8) are from Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). 
Notes: 
 
Data in all columns are based on the definition of manufactures used in trade statistics, except the data in columns (3) 
and (4) which are based on the definition used in industrial statistics. However, calculating the share in world 
manufactured exports based on the definition used in industrial statistics yields very similar results for countries for 
which comprehensive data are available. 
a  Excluding China.  
b 1984.  
c 1999.  
d 1997.  
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International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). However, calculating the share in world 
exports of manufactures based on the definition used in industrial statistics yields very similar results 
for countries for which comprehensive data are available. The four columns on the right-hand side of 
table 1 make the same comparison for the 34-country sample regarding 1980 and 1998. All data in 
these four columns refer to the definition of manufactures used in trade statistics.
5 
 
The first two columns of table 1 show that the share of developing countries in world exports of 
manufactures has risen, while that of developed countries has fallen. This supports the prediction that 
manufactured exports have risen more from developing than from developed countries. Columns (3) 
and (4) show that the share of both developed and developing countries in world manufactured value 
added has risen by about eight percentage points. This increase contrasts with the strong decline in the 
absolute share of countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Hence, looking only at the 
relationship between developed and developing countries, the increase in the share of developing 
countries has proportionally been much stronger. This result broadly supports the prediction that 
manufacturing value added has declined in developed and risen in developing countries and that the 
bulk of manufactured value added has remained in developed countries. 
 
Comparing the evidence across columns (1)￿(4) reveals that growth in a country￿s share in world 
exports of manufactures does not necessarily imply a corresponding increase in its share in world 
manufacturing income. While the share of developed countries in world exports of manufactures fell 
between 1980 and the late 1990s, their share in world manufacturing income rose significantly. Thus, 
in relative terms, developed countries seem to be trading less but earning more in manufacturing 
activity. Developing economies￿ shares both in world manufacturing exports and income strongly rose 
during the same period, but growth in exports was much stronger than in income. This supports the 
prediction that developing countries have increased their manufactured exports by much more than 
manufacturing value added. 
 
Columns (5)￿(8) of table 1 show the same general pattern suggesting that changes within the 34-
country sample can be used as an approximation for changes in the world economy. The one major 
difference compared to the results on the left-hand side of the table is that columns (7) and (8) show a 
slight decrease in the share of developed countries in total manufacturing value added. However, this 
comes as no surprise given that developed countries are over-represented and ￿ due to limitations on 
data availability ￿ countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are under-represented in 
the 34-country sample compared to their actual share in world manufacturing value added (in 
particular at the beginning of the sample period). However, the results that refer to the percentage 
shares of country groups within the 34-country sample as reported in columns (7) and (8) mirror the 
percentage shares in world total manufacturing value added at constant 1990 prices, as reported by 
UNIDO (2002:32). These results strengthen empirical support for the above findings that refer to 
changes in the relative shares of developed and developing countries in the world economy as a whole. 
 
Turning to country-specific evidence, there appears to be little correlation between the growth of 
manufactured exports and manufacturing value added for any of the developing economies. All Asian 
economies in table 1 increased their shares in world exports of manufactures; in Latin America this 
was true only for Mexico, while the other major economies in Latin America, notably Argentina and 
                                                      
5 The data in the original dataset of Nicita and Olarreaga (2001) refers to the definition of manufactures used in 
industrial statistics. For the difference between the definition of manufactures in trade and industrial statistics 
and the corresponding adjustments made to the original dataset see Appendix 1.  
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Brazil, have been unable to increase their shares in world exports of manufactures. Similarly, with the 
exception of Hong Kong (China) and the Philippines, all East Asian countries increased their shares in 
world manufacturing value added, but none in Latin America was able to do so. This gives empirical 
support to one of the key implications of new economic geography models, namely that the move of 
industrial activity away from developed countries does not benefit all developing countries at the same 
time or in the same way. 
 
 
V. LOCATIONAL GINI COEFFICIENTS 
 
Given that the intensity of intermediate input use differs across industrial sectors, the prediction that 
the spread of industry from developed to developing countries affects neither all developing countries 
nor all industrial sectors at the same time or to the same extent would be reflected in a difference 
between specialization trends in trade and those in production at both the sectoral and country levels. 
 
Looking at country-specific evidence first, table 2 reports the Gini coefficients for exports of 
manufactures calculated as two- or three-year averages around the dates indicated for each of the 34 
countries and as unweighted averages for selected country groups. The coefficients have fallen for 
most countries suggesting a more equal spread of trading activities in manufactures in the world 
economy and a decrease in countries￿ specialization. The decline in the Gini coefficient is particularly 
strong for developing countries, for which the average fell from 0.65 in 1980 to 0.52 in 1998, while it 
remained unchanged for the group of developed countries. Regarding individual countries, the Gini 
coefficient declined most for Malaysia, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan Province of 
China. 
 
By contrast, the locational Gini coefficients for manufacturing value added have fallen for a much 
smaller number of countries, (table 3).
6 Moreover, the unweighted average of the coefficients 
remained unchanged for developing countries, while it rose for developed countries during the period 
1980￿1998, suggesting a less equal spread of manufacturing production in the world economy and an 
increase in countries￿ specialization. 
 
Taken together, the country-specific evidence supports the prediction that changes in geographic 
concentration of economic activity differ across countries. Moreover, the results for manufacturing 
value added show that little industrial activity has spread to developing countries ￿ the main changes 
occurring in the Republic of Korea that, followed by Taiwan Province of China, experienced the 
strongest sustained fall in its Gini coefficient for manufacturing value added ￿ even though a number 
of developing countries, notably Malaysia and Mexico, experienced a sizable change in their structure 
of manufactured exports. Thus, a change in a country￿s structure of manufactured exports does not 





                                                      
6 The recent finding by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) that countries exhibit a U-shaped pattern in their evolution of 
sectoral concentration (comprising agriculture, manufacturing and services) in relation to the level of per capita 
income and that this applies also to the manufacturing sector alone, although in a less significant way, calls into 
question the appropriateness of calculating linear growth rates such as reported in table 3. However, closer 
analysis suggests that such a U-shaped development cannot be observed for the countries included in the sample 




Country Gini coefficients for exports of manufactures 
 
Region/economy 1980￿81 1984￿86 1989￿91 1994￿96 1997￿98   
Average annual 
growth rate 
(Per cent)  t-value
Developed countries  0.35 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.35    -0.2      
Core developed countries  0.23 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.21    -0.8      
  France  0.15  0.16  0.17 0.19 0.18    1.4    6.9 
    Germany  0.12 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16    1.6    6.5 
    Italy  0.29 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.30    -0.1    -0.5 
    Japan  0.30 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.23    -1.6    -9.6 
    Netherlands  0.34 0.41 0.29 0.29 0.28    -2.2    -4.8 
  United Kingdom  0.19  0.20  0.17  0.17  0.15    -1.4   -3.5 
  United States  0.20  0.22  0.17  0.14  0.13    -2.9   -9.9 
European Periphery  0.46 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47    0.3      
    Greece  0.66 0.72 0.72 0.62 0.58    -0.8    -2.6 
    Ireland  0.35 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.49    1.6    7.1 
    Portugal  0.55 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.48    -0.5    -2.2 
    Spain  0.29 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.33    0.8    4.6 
Other developed countries  0.40 0.42 0.39 0.43 0.42    0.1      
    Austria  0.30 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.21    -2.4    -8.0 
    Canada  0.46 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.43    -0.4    -2.7 
  Denmark  0.28  0.31  0.31 0.32 0.31    0.5    3.0 
  Finland  0.54  0.49  0.50 0.60 0.66    1.3    3.3 
    Norway  0.32 0.35 0.35 0.52 0.49    2.9    5.9 
  South Africa  0.58  0.67  0.55  0.58  0.50    -0.9   -2.3 
    Sweden  0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32    -0.2    -2.3 
Developing countries  0.65 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.52    -1.5     
Latin America  0.65 0.64 0.61 0.57 0.54    -1.4     
    Chile  0.77 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.68    -0.9    -6.5 
    Colombia  0.63 0.63 0.71 0.64 0.57    -0.2    -0.5 
  Costa Rica  0.67  0.66  0.63  0.61  0.54    -0.9   -2.8 
    Mexico  0.55 0.35 0.35 0.23 0.27    -4.7    -5.3 
    Venezuela  0.63 0.77 0.62 0.65 0.66    -0.3    -0.9 
South and East Asia  0.62 0.60 0.54 0.50 0.49    -1.7     
  NIEs  0.55 0.51 0.45 0.42 0.41    -2.0     
    Hong Kong (China)  0.72  0.66  0.54  0.61  0.61    -1.1   -3.4 
    Republic of Korea  0.54  0.45  0.42  0.33  0.29    -3.3   -14.3 
    Singapore  0.40  0.41  0.42 0.45 0.45    0.9    6.7 
    Taiwan Province of China  0.56  0.53  0.40  0.30  0.31    -4.3   -16.4 
  ASEAN  0.71 0.64 0.60 0.51 0.51    -2.1     
    Malaysia  0.71  0.62  0.57 0.49 0.46    -2.6    -23.5 
    Philippines  0.71  0.65  0.62  0.53  0.56    -1.7   -9.9 
    China  0.67 0.71 0.62 0.60 0.54    -1.3    -6.9 
    India  0.66 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.69    0.1    0.5 
Turkey  0.82 0.70 0.72 0.67 0.64    -1.0    -4.6 
Countries in Eastern Europe  0.38 0.29 0.35 0.37 0.29    0.2     
    Hungary  0.45 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.18    -2.2    -2.0 
    Poland  0.32 0.30 0.37 0.44 0.41    2.5    4.1 




Country Gini coefficients for manufacturing value added 
 
Region/economy  1980￿81 1984￿86 1989￿91 1994￿96 1997￿98    
Average annual
growth rate 
(Per cent)  t-value
Developed countries  0.22 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.28    1.0     
Core developed countries  0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16    0.6     
  France  0.11  0.09  0.10 0.12 0.11   1.1   3.2 
  Germany  0.14  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.16    0.3   1.5 
  Italy  0.17  0.21  0.21  0.22  0.24    1.2   4.0 
  Japan  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.08  0.08    -1.6   -2.9 
  Netherlands  0.28  0.36  0.31  0.26  0.26    -1.2   -2.2 
  United Kingdom  0.09  0.09  0.10 0.15 0.15   4.0   5.7 
  United States  0.10  0.11 0.14 0.11 0.10   0.4   0.6 
European Periphery  0.33 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.39    0.8     
  Greece  0.42  0.47  0.44  0.43  0.42    -0.2   -1.2 
  Ireland  0.31  0.34  0.34  0.41  0.46    2.2   8.7 
  Portugal  0.40  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.44    0.7   3.4 
  Spain  0.21  0.22  0.21  0.22  0.26    0.7   3.1 
Other developed countries  0.24 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.33    1.5     
  Austria  0.21  0.23  0.24  0.24  0.25    0.5   2.7 
  Canada  0.22  0.23  0.23 0.26 0.27   1.0   5.7 
  Denmark  0.21  0.23  0.24 0.24 0.25   1.3   4.4 
  Finland  0.34  0.33  0.34 0.46 0.49   2.3   4.5 
  Norway  0.24  0.28  0.29  0.48  0.48    4.4   7.5 
  South Africa  0.23  0.29  0.30  0.28  0.31    1.3   3.8 
  Sweden  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.26    0.1   0.5 
Developing countries  0.42 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.42    -0.3     
Latin America  0.43 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.47    0.2     
  Chile  0.43  0.52  0.48  0.49  0.49    0.0   0.1 
  Colombia  0.39  0.41  0.41  0.42  0.45    0.6   4.2 
  Costa Rica  0.46  0.50  0.48  0.46  0.47    -0.2   -1.0 
  Mexico  0.53  0.40  0.39  0.44  0.45    -1.0   -1.8 
  Venezuela  0.34  0.41  0.39  0.43  0.49    1.5   5.4 
South and East Asia  0.42 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.39    -0.6     
  NIEs  0.42 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.37    -1.1     
    Hong Kong (China)  0.62  0.63  0.57  0.55  0.55    -0.9   -8.1 
    Republic of Korea  0.35  0.30  0.25  0.23  0.21    -2.9   -13.1 
    Singapore  0.34  0.37  0.35 0.40 0.39   1.0   2.2 
    Taiwan Province of China  0.38  0.41  0.34  0.33  0.34    -1.4   -5.0 
  ASEAN  0.43 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.41    -0.5     
    Malaysia  0.43  0.45  0.40  0.41  0.40    -0.6   -3.2 
    Philippines  0.44  0.46  0.46  0.42  0.43    -0.3   -1.4 
  China  0.41  0.39  0.39  0.46  0.41    0.3   1.1 
  India  0.40  0.38  0.36  0.39  0.40    0.0   -0.2 
Turkey  0.41 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43   0.2   1.3 
Countries in Eastern Europe  0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25    -0.5     
  Hungary  0.25  0.23  0.21  0.21  0.23    -0.7   -2.8 
  Poland  0.28  0.30  0.29  0.26  0.27    -0.4   -1.5 




Turning to the sectoral level, table 4 shows that the Gini coefficients for exports of manufactures 
declined in half of the 22 sectors, indicating a lower geographical concentration of industries. This 
contrasts with the evidence of table 5 that shows a decline in the Gini coefficients for manufacturing 
value added in only 7 of the 22 sectors. Taken together, the two tables show that the Gini-coefficients 
for both exports and value added have changed relatively little in the vast majority of sectors (the 
growth rate is below 1.5 percentage points in either direction for 19 out of the 22 sectors in exports 
and 16 out of the 22 sectors for value added). But they also show that there have been relatively 
pronounced changes in a few sectors. Moreover, in these sectors the coefficients for exports and those 
for value added have often changed in opposite directions, indicating lower spatial concentration in 
exports of manufactures and higher spatial concentration in manufacturing value added. This holds in 
particular for textiles, wearing apparel, footwear, and electrical machinery for the period between the 
mid-1980s and the late 1990s. This gives support to the prediction that changes in the geographic 




Sector-specific Gini coefficients for exports of manufactures 
 
Sector description  1980￿81 1984￿86 1989￿91 1994￿96 1997￿98   
Average annual 
growth rate 
(Per cent)  t-value
Textiles  0.35 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.43    1.16   4.03
Wearing  apparel  0.59 0.65 0.60 0.56 0.55    -0.75    -4.52
Leather  products  0.46 0.55 0.58 0.64 0.63    1.76    12.60
Footwear  0.70 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.67    -0.37    -4.90
Wood  products  0.63 0.64 0.60 0.62 0.60    -0.29    -2.97
Furniture and fixtures  0.46  0.49  0.46  0.48  0.48    0.00    -0.03
Paper & products  0.58  0.56  0.54  0.52  0.50    -0.96    -10.28
Printing & publishing  0.30  0.31  0.31  0.33  0.32    0.41    2.77
Industrial  chemicals  0.24 0.27 0.22 0.25 0.25    -0.28    -0.81
Other  chemicals  0.27 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.33    1.01   4.43
Rubber  products  0.27 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23    -0.53    -2.44
Plastic  products  0.41 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.40    -0.41    -2.23
Pottery,  china  etc.  0.44 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.47    0.55   6.10
Glass & products  0.30  0.34  0.27  0.23  0.22    -2.51    -7.27
Non-metallic  mineral  products  0.40 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.44    0.59   3.84
Iron  &  steel  0.35 0.37 0.32 0.34 0.33    -0.55    -1.71
Fabricated metal products  0.12  0.16  0.20  0.20  0.20    3.08    7.55
Non-electrical  machinery  0.20 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19    -0.58    -2.04
Electrical  machinery  0.23 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.23    -0.07    -0.31
Transport  equipment  0.21 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.28    1.37   6.98
Professional & scientific equipment  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24    -0.03    -0.31
Other  manufactured  products  0.38 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.46    0.96   6.12










Sector-specific Gini coefficients for manufacturing value added 
 
Sector description  1980–811984￿86 1989￿91 1994￿96 1997￿98   
Average annual
growth rate 
(Per cent)  t-value 
Textiles  0.30 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.24    -1.1    -5.58
Wearing  apparel  0.23 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.30    1.3   8.62
Leather  products  0.28 0.37 0.35 0.47 0.53    3.3    11.29
Footwear  0.37 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.52    1.9    10.42
Wood  products  0.22 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.21    0.1   0.39
Furniture  and  fixtures  0.18 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21    1.6   4.49
Paper  &  products  0.21 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.17    -1.1    -4.19
Printing  &  publishing  0.19 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.21    0.8   4.06
Industrial  chemicals  0.12 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.17    1.3   3.09
Other  chemicals  0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.11    2.3   4.91
Rubber  products  0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.14    -0.9    -1.91
Plastic  products  0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.08    -2.8    -9.11
Pottery,  china  etc.  0.45 0.45 0.45 0.38 0.41    -0.9    -4.38
Glass  &  products  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14    0.3   1.36
Non-metallic  mineral  products  0.19 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.22    1.2   2.87
Iron  &  steel  0.18 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.25    1.1   2.34
Fabricated  metal  products  0.07 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.13    5.1   8.77
Non-electrical  machinery  0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12    1.2   4.01
Electrical  machinery  0.11 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13    1.0   2.31
Transport  equipment  0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09    -0.2    -0.46
Professional  &  scientific  equipment  0.28 0.29 0.38 0.32 0.29    0.6   1.12
Other  manufactured  products  0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19    -0.8    -3.12
Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). 
 
 
VI. PERIPHERALITY AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION 
 
Gini coefficients measure the degree of geographic concentration but take no account of the position 
of countries relative to each other. As such, they cannot give information on one of the principal 
insights of the new economic geography, namely that a location￿s market access can be a powerful 
attractor for increasing-returns activities with a resulting centre-periphery dimension of industrial 
production and that the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces that determine the centre-
periphery dimension might change over time. This section focuses on the centre-periphery dimension 
of industrial production and addresses the broad prediction that industries where labour costs or access 
to natural resources are crucial determinants of production costs as a whole will be less agglomerated 
in central places than industries where economies of scale or technology play an important role. The 
classification of industries follows OECD (1992:152).
7 
                                                      
7 The technology category used here combines the categories ￿specialized supplier￿ and ￿science-based￿ that the 
OECD forms on the basis of ISIC 4-digit headings. Given that the data used in this paper are available only at 
the level of ISIC 3-digit sectors, the two categories have to be aggregated. There is no such aggregation problem 
for the other three industry categories.  
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A country￿s location in the core-periphery dimension can be defined by its relative market access. 
Following Br￿lhart and Traeger (2003), one can calculate a peripherality index that closely 
corresponds to Harris￿s market-potential measure and expresses market potential as the inverse-


















where Gs denotes a country￿s GDP (measured in current US dollar) and Trs is a measure of market 
access. Market access can be calculated simply using the geographical distance between two countries 
and calculating intra-country transport costs by the formula dist = 0.33(area/π)
1/2 that gives the 
average distance between two points in a circular country. 
 
Based on these measures of market access, centre-periphery gradients can be estimated for each 
industrial sector and year as follows: 
 
irt r it it irt P L ε ϕ φ + + = ln  
 
where Lirt is the locational Gini coefficient (expressed in logarithmic terms to make it symmetric) of 
country r for sector i in year t, Ф and φ are regression coefficients, and ε is a stochastic error. To 
assess the statistical significance of changes in ϕ ￿  between sample years, F tests can be computed on 
the hypothesis that  0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = x t t ϕ ϕ , using seemingly unrelated regression estimates in order to account 
for cross-equation error correlation. 
 
The results of the centre-periphery regression based on this measure are shown in table 6 for the years 
1980, 1990 and 1998. Roughly two-third out of the sixty-six centre-periphery gradients are statistically 
significant and the vast majority of them have the expected sign, i.e. they are positive (indicating 
industrial activity in the periphery) for labour and resource-intensive industries and negative 
(indicating industrial activity in the centre) for the other industrial sectors. The main sectors for which 
the centre-periphery gradients are statistically significant but have a sign opposite to expectations 
include those for which the OECD-classification of industrial categories may be debatable. These 
sectors are rubber products and iron and steel, which are classified as scale-intensive industries but 
clearly have a strong natural-resource content, and fabricated metal products, which is likely to be the 
resource-intensive sector that has the highest demand on engineering skills and technology. The 
coefficients for wearing apparel, which is perhaps the most important labour-intensive sector, have the 
correct sign but are mostly statistically not significant. This may indicate that the quota regulations and 
other non-tariff measures that have governed apparel trade for the past few decades have had a 
stronger impact on the distribution of industrial activity in the world economy than considerations 
related to factor costs and linkage effects. 
 
Most of the statistically significant changes in the coefficients regard labour-intensive industries. The 
results show that agglomeration in wearing apparel, leather products, and footwear decreased between 
1980 and 1998, but agglomeration in textiles increased during the 1990s. The opposing developments 
in the textile and apparel sectors are likely to be due to international production fragmentation with 
activities in the more capital- and technology-intensive textile sector remaining in central areas and 
activities in the more labour-intensive apparel sector moving to geographically close low-wage 
countries (see e.g. Gereffi 1999). By contrast, changes in the coefficients are not statistically   Table 6 
Regression results for centre-periphery gradients, market access based on geographical distance 
 
 
  Sector  Year  Coeff on P*100  R-sq 
Chi-square 
Wald test    Sector  Year Coeff on P*100  R-sq 
Chi-square 
Wald test 
L  Textiles  1980  17.86***  0.26              SC  Printing & publishing  1980 ￿9.77**  0.10             
     1990  13.75***  0.12  1.82           1990 ￿12.47**  0.14  0.59        
      1998  8.78   0.04  5.59** 5.45**       1998 ￿13.98**  0.15  0.01    0.37   
L  Wearing apparel  1980  6.75   0.03              SC  Industrial chemicals  1980 ￿1.22   0.00             
     1990  13.30**  0.10  4.62**           1990 5.88  0.05  2.00       
      1998  12.51   0.06  7.01   3.94**       1998 9.33**  0.11  0.89    2.80 * 
L  Leather products  1980  7.30   0.05              SC  Other chemicals  1980 8.26**  0.09             
     1990  14.92**  0.12  3.18*           1990 8.58*  0.09  0.61       
      1998  17.14**  0.13  0.00   1.42         1998 3.43   0.01  1.19    1.79   
L  Footwear  1980  7.23   0.04              SC  Rubber products  1980 15.64***  0.24             
     1990  16.86**  0.09  5.62**           1990 15.14**  0.16  0.07       
      1998  25.48***  0.15  1.60   6.18**       1998 19.17**  0.23  0.02    0.11   
R  Wood products  1980  4.67   0.01              SC  Plastic products  1980 0.49   0.00             
     1990  4.75  0.01  0.03            1990 ￿3.61  0.03  0.84       
      1998  6.52   0.02  2.09   0.89         1998 ￿0.52   0.00  1.51    0.06   
R  Furniture and fixtures  1980  ￿12.06*  0.08              SC  Iron & steel  1980 3.11   0.01             
     1990  ￿10.13  0.05  0.98            1990 12.73*  0.09  2.94 *      
      1998  ￿6.12   0.01  0.37   0.90         1998 23.55**  0.23  1.32    4.24 ** 
R  Paper & products  1980  5.88   0.03              T  Non-electrical machinery  1980 ￿19.75***  0.31             
     1990  7.37**  0.06  0.03           1990 ￿20.72***  0.35  0.18        
      1998  8.38*  0.06  0.12   0.10         1998 ￿22.63***  0.48  0.27    0.52   
R  Pottery, china etc.  1980  0.70   0.00              T  Electrical machinery  1980 ￿9.89***  0.20             
     1990  3.30  0.01  0.46           1990 ￿9.89***  0.17  0.47        
      1998  16.80   0.10  2.89* 3.76*        1998 ￿10.34**  0.11  0.01    0.20   
R  Glass & products  1980  2.97   0.01              T  Transport equipment  1980 ￿5.84**  0.07             
     1990  7.73*  0.08  1.00            1990 ￿7.95**  0.09  1.33       
      1998  12.77***  0.21  2.49   2.86*        1998 ￿2.66   0.01  0.85    0.00   
R  Non-metallic mineral products  1980  5.22*  0.04              T  Professional & scientific equipment  1980 ￿27.14***  0.27             
     1990  11.63***  0.23  3.78*          1990 ￿20.05***  0.19  5.14  **      
      1998  15.07***  0.36  0.12   2.48         1998 ￿24.25***  0.33  1.69    0.40   
L  Fabricated metal products  1980  ￿6.73***  0.19              L  Other manufactured products  1980 ￿4.07   0.01             
     1990  ￿7.69***  0.19  0.14            1990 ￿3.26  0.01  1.10       
      1998  ￿7.24***  0.12  0.00   0.05         1998 ￿8.82   0.07  1.00    0.00   






significant for electrical machinery (including telecommunications equipment and semi-conductors) 
and non-electrical machinery (including computers), i.e. sectors for which international production 
fragmentation is also well documented (e.g. Ernst and Ravenhill 1999) and which are characterized by 
downstream labour-intensive activities and a high intensity in the use of intermediate inputs that, 
however, are easily traded. Indeed, these sectors continue to be among those in which value added is 
agglomerated most strongly in central areas.
8 
 
To sum, apart from the special case of wearing apparel, the estimation results support the broad 
predictions that centre-periphery patterns differ across industrial sectors and that labour- or resource-
intensive industries are less agglomerated in central places than industries where economies of scale or 
technology play an important role. Agglomeration has further declined in traditional labour-intensive 
industries (such as apparel, leather products, and footwear), while there has been no statistically 
significant decline in agglomeration in electrical or non-electrical machinery, where downstream 
activities are also more labour intensive than upstream activities but where existing linkages in 
developing countries may be relatively low because the relatively technology intensive intermediate 
inputs are mostly imported from developed countries, and the demand for final output is relatively low 
in developing countries so that the bulk of output is re-exported. 
 
One implication of these findings is that changes in a developing country￿s structure of manufactured 
exports may not be accompanied by a corresponding change in the structure of its manufacturing value 
added. This implication can be further addressed by examining the similarity of industrial structures 
between countries at different levels of development. Comparing the industry shares for each country 
with the corresponding shares for other individual countries yields a full matrix of bilateral differences 
between the industrial structures of pairs of countries and thus provides evidence on whether the 
income structures of manufacturing show a tendency towards greater uniformity across countries at 
different levels of development.
9 
 
The results in table 7 show that among the developing countries listed in the table, the Republic of 
Korea stands out by having reached a manufacturing value added structure that is by far the most 
similar one with respect to the leading developed countries. The structure of China, Malaysia, Mexico, 
and the Philippines became slightly more similar to that of the major developed countries but still 
diverge significantly. By contrast, changes in the bilateral structural similarity indices for 
manufactured exports in these four countries were much stronger than in the Republic of Korea. This, 
again, shows that for developing countries changes in the structure of manufactured exports are often 
not associated with a corresponding change in its structure of manufacturing value added. 
                                                      
8 It is also interesting to note that the size of the coefficient for transport equipment strongly declined during the 
1990s and, contrary to the earlier years, was not statistically significant for 1998. In part, this could be due to the 
fact that some PTAs among developing countries such as Mercosur and the ASEAN Free Trade Area have 
supported the creation of regionally production networks and boosted the automobile industry in, for example, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Thailand. However, it seems that this has not significantly reduced agglomeration as the 
change in the coefficient is statistically not significant. 





Structural similarity indices for exports of manufactures and manufacturing value added for selected developing economies,
1980￿1981 and 1997￿1998 
United States  Japan  Germany 



























Chile  1.33 1.15   0.74 0.82  1.50 1.33 0.69  0.76 1.30  1.08    0.84  0.88 
China  1.14 0.89   0.68 0.62  1.31 0.90 0.61  0.57 1.08  0.99    0.60  0.60 
Colombia 1.17  1.10    0.69  0.76  1.35  1.27 0.67  0.74 1.16  0.97    0.73  0.85 
Costa Rica  1.22  0.86   0.78  0.76  1.29  0.94 0.75  0.79 1.16  0.97    0.82  0.88 
Hong Kong (China)  1.26  1.01   0.95  0.73  1.24  1.03 0.94  0.79 1.29 1.17   1.03 0.93 
India  1.26 1.27   0.69 0.68  1.34 1.34 0.58  0.63 1.24  1.19    0.61  0.66 
Malaysia 1.32  0.71    0.71  0.67  1.19  0.71 0.59  0.68 1.31  0.88    0.72  0.61 
Mexico 0.90  0.47    0.91  0.80  0.93  0.45 0.82  0.74 0.91  0.50    0.85  0.73 
Philippines 1.30  0.92    0.75  0.67  1.35  0.93 0.77  0.63 1.25  1.05    0.79  0.71 
Republic of Korea  1.06  0.53   0.61  0.38  0.90  0.52 0.52  0.36 0.94 0.58   0.59 0.31 
Singapore 0.74  0.70    0.47  0.57  0.63  0.36 0.47  0.57 0.72  0.89    0.46  0.51 
Taiwan Province of China  1.08  0.57   0.66  0.64 0.97  0.57 0.55  0.55 1.05 0.67   0.59 0.52 
Venezuela 0.95  0.93    0.59  0.78  1.06  1.19 0.51  0.73 0.98  0.97    0.63  0.79 
Memo item:  Structural  similarity  with              
  developed  countries’  average              
Developing  countries  0.87  0.57    0.46  0.37              





Changes in the sectoral composition of economic activities regarding trade and production are a key 
factor of the process of economic development. Focusing on the developmental elements of new 
economic geography models, the main objective of this paper was to distil and test broad empirical 
predictions as to how the current process of globalization has affected industrialization in developing 
countries. The findings support the predictions that the decline in trade barriers has weakened the 
importance of industrial linkages in developed countries and favoured the spread of industrial activity 
from developed to geographically close developing countries in sectors that are intensive in immobile 
primary factors and that are not too heavily dependent on linkages with other firms, i.e. in traditional 
labour-intensive sectors such as apparel, leather products, and footwear. 
 
By contrast, there is no indication of a significant spread of industry in sectors that would strongly rely 
on forward and backward linkages in developing countries. This is exemplified best by the electrical 
and non-electrical machinery sectors that continue to be among those for which agglomeration is 
strongest. Hence, the recent wave of international production fragmentation in these sectors has not 
been associated with a strengthening of either forward (e.g. through increased domestic production of 
intermediate production inputs) or backward linkages (e.g. through increased domestic output demand 
from either other domestic manufacturing firms or consumers) in developing countries. 
 
There has been a sizable change in both the size and structure of manufactured exports from 
developing countries but not in their manufacturing value added. The findings also show that the  
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increase in the share of developing countries as a group in world exports of manufactures has not been 
accompanied by concomitant increases in their share in world manufacturing value added. Similarly, 
the sectoral structure of manufactured exports from developing countries has become more similar to 
that of manufactured exports from developed countries, but the sectoral structure of manufacturing 
value added has not. In other words, the patterns of manufactured exports from developed and 
developing countries have converged, contrary to the patterns of manufacturing value added. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, the findings point to an important difference in the extent to which the 
spread of industrial activity benefits the industrialization process in developing countries and suggest 
that this difference depends on their existing level of industrial development. Developing countries in 
an early stage of industrialization that attract relocating industrial activity mainly on the basis of 
factor-price differences, such as probably exemplified best by Malaysia and Mexico, experience a 
change in their structure of manufactured exports accompanied by little change in their of 
manufacturing value added. By contrast, developing countries whose well-established industrial base 
allow them to enjoy linkage-related effects, such as exemplified by the Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
Province of China, experience a change in the structure of manufacturing value added without 
necessarily experiencing a concomitant change in their structure of manufactured exports. To the 
extent that this is the case, a continuation of the observed spread of industry would reinforce existing 
differences between developing countries with regard to their level of industrial development. 
 
Thus, a major challenge facing developing countries is how to extract from their increasing integration 
into the international trading system the elements that will promote industrialization and, in particular, 
how to create the critical mass of linkages that provide pecuniary externalities to industrial firms. 
Experience of successful countries, such as the Republic of Korea, suggests that this means combining 
the opportunities offered by world markets with a growth strategy that mobilizes the capabilities of 
domestic institutions and investors. The accumulation of capital, both human and physical, and the 
provision of appropriate infrastructure with a view to raising productivity clearly continue to be key 
factors in this regard. Also important are trade policy measures by developed countries designed to 
reduce access barriers to imports of high-value goods from developing countries. 
 
While the above findings give support to the broad empirical predictions of new economic geography 
models, they do not allow favouring one specific theoretical approach over others. This is because the 
broad predictions come from models presented in a number of different theoretical studies that do not 
share a uniform and consistent set of assumptions. Moreover, technology transfer and technological 
change clearly influence the evolution of the aggregate indices on which the empirical analysis of this 
paper is based. However, technology factors other than those related to transport costs are absent from 
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Country and data coverage 
 
The data set includes 34 countries, i.e. all those countries that had at least US$2 billion worth of 
manufactured exports in 1998, collectively accounting for 99 percent of world exports of 
manufactures, and for which comprehensive sectoral data on manufacturing value added are available 
in Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). The country classification follows the United Nations categories that, 
unlike some other institutions, classify South Africa as a developed and Turkey as a developing 
country. 
 
Developed countries (18 countries): Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
United States. 
 
Developing countries (14 countries); Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong (China), India, 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Turkey, 
Venezuela. 
 
Countries in Eastern Europe (2 countries): Hungary, Poland. 
 
 
The dataset includes 22 sectors, i.e. based on the definition of manufactures used in trade statistics 
(SITC), all sectors at the 3-digit level of industrial statistics (ISIC, Revision 2), except food products, 
beverages, tobacco, petroleum refineries, miscellaneous petroleum and coal products, and non-ferrous 
metals, which SITC defines as primary products. Sector-specific data were not available for the 
following countries and years: 
 
Wearing apparel  China (all years); Netherlands (1983￿87); 
Leather products  Mexico (1984￿98); Netherlands (1983￿87); 
Footwear  China (all years); 
Industrial chemicals  China (1994￿97); Hong Kong (China) (1993￿98);  
  Finland (1995￿98); Norway (1993￿98); 
Other chemicals  China (1994￿97); Hong Kong (China) (1993￿98); 
Pottery, china etc  Hong Kong (China) (1992￿95); Finland (1995￿98);  
  France (1996￿98); Norway (1993￿95); Singapore (1980￿97); 
Glass & products  Hong Kong (China) (1994); Netherlands (1981￿87);  
 Singapore  (1980￿97); 
Non-met mineral products  Netherlands (1981￿87); United Kingdom (1993￿94); 
Iron and steel    Costa Rica (1985￿97); Netherlands (1981￿88); Norway (1993￿98);  
    United Kingdom (1993￿94); 
Non-electrical machinery  Finland (1995￿98); Norway (1993￿98); 




Imputations and other adjustments made to the dataset given by Nicita and Olarreaga (2001): 
 
Chile  Mirrored exports for 1980; 
China  Mirrored exports for all years; value added for 1998  
 from  UNIDO  (2002); 
Hong Kong (China)  Mirrored exports for all years; 
Costa Rica  Mirrored exports for 1980; value added for 1998 imputed  
  assuming growth of 8% over 1997 with no sectoral change 
France  Value added for 1996￿1998 imputed assuming the same overall  
  growth as in the OECD STAN database and constant  
  sectoral proportions with G-4 countries as during 1990￿1995; 
Germany  Value added for 1994￿1998 imputed as for France; 
Hungary  Mirrored exports for all years; 
Ireland  Value added for 1998 from UNIDO (2002); 
Italy  Value added for 1995￿1998 from UNIDO (2002); 
Korea, Republic of  Value added for 1998 imputed based on UNIDO (2002) growth  
  rates of value added in national currency to exclude impact  
  of short-run exchange-rate changes following the Asian crisis; 
Mexico  Mirrored exports for 1980; 
Philippines  Value added for 1998 imputed assuming decline by 2% over 1997  
  with no sectoral change; 
Portugal  Value added for 1998 from UNIDO (2002); 
Singapore  Value added for 1998 imputed as for the Republic of Korea; 
South Africa  Mirrored exports for 1985; 
Taiwan Province of China  Value added for 1997￿1998 imputed assuming annual growth of 
7% and 5%, respectively, with no sectoral change; 
Turkey  Mirrored exports for 1980; 
United States  Mirrored exports for 1980; value added for 1997￿1998 imputed  
  assuming annual growth of 4% and 2%, respectively with no  





Centre-periphery gradients based on estimated market access 
 
 
This appendix discusses the robustness of the results from the centre-periphery regression in section 
VI. It employs an alternative specification of market access that has the attractive characteristic of 
being rooted in economic theory (Redding and Venables, 2004a) and calculates market access from a 
structural model that uses the predicted values of the sum of domestic market access (DMA) and 
foreign market access (FMA) as parameters: 
 
2 1 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * * )) (exp( )) (exp( ￿ ￿ ￿ δ δ γ δ γ
rs rs s r s rr r r r rs bord dist ptn dist cty A M F A M D T ∑ ≠ + = + =  
 
where distrr = 0.33(area/π)
1/2 to give a country￿s trading costs on its domestic market and where γ￿,  1 ￿ δ  
and  2 ￿ δ  are the estimated coefficients of a gravity equation of the form: 
 
() ( ) rs rs rs s r rs u bord dist D D X + + + + + = 2 1ln ln δ δ γ β α  
 
where Xrs is the value of exports from country r to country s, Dr and Ds are dummy variables for the 
exporter and importer countries, dist is the geographical distance between the main cities of the two 
countries, bord is a dummy variable for whether or not the two countries share a common border, and 
u is a stochastic error.
10 
 
The additional advantage of this measure is that it reflects the impact of preferential market access and 
other trade policy measures that influence a country￿s industrial activity, as discussed in section II, in 
addition to geographical distance, which is the focus of the measure in section VI.
11 On the other hand, 
the fact that the measure is based on export data represents an important drawback for the purpose of 
this paper. Given that a change in the size or structure a country￿s exports is not always accompanied 
by corresponding changes in manufacturing value added, using this measure to assess changes in the 
distribution of manufacturing value across countries may not be fully appropriate. While there are no a 
priori reasons to argue that this drawback outweighs the advantages of this measure, the results need to 
be interpreted with caution. 
                                                      
10 See Head and Mayer (2003) for discussion of these measures. 
11 The two measures of market potential have a very low correlation coefficient (0.29) but a very substantial part 
of the difference between the two measures is due to the difference that they attribute to the United States 
economy compared to the rest of the sample. This difference is very large in the estimated market access. 
Excluding the United States from the sample raises the correlation coefficient to 0.51.  
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The results of the centre-periphery regression based on estimated trade costs are shown in table A1.
12 
While the statistical significance of the results is generally lower than for the measure in section VI, 
they give support to the finding that industries where labour costs or access to natural resources are 
crucial determinants of production costs are less agglomerated in central places than industries where 
economies of scale or technology play an important role. By contrast, none of the changes in the 
coefficients is statistically significant. This would suggest that neither international production 
fragmentation associated with the decline in communication and transport costs and preferential 
trading arrangements between developed and developing countries nor PTAs between developing 
countries fostered the spread of industry to developing countries in a statistically significant way. 
However, as explained above this result needs to be treated with caution because there is no close 
correspondence between changes in exports and value added. 
 
                                                      
12 The estimated trade costs refer to four-year averages around the specific years.  
Table A1 
Regression results for centre-periphery gradients, estimated market access 
 
 Sector  Year  Coeff  on  P*100  R-sq
Chi-square 
Wald test    Sector  Year Coeff on P*100  R-sq
Chi-square 
Wald test 
L  Textiles  1980  1.81***  0.05        SC  Printing & publishing  1980 ￿1.11***  0.02       
     1990  1.37***  0.02  0.46       1990 ￿1.51***  0.04  0.08     
      1998  0.65   0.00  1.54 1.37       1998 ￿1.02***  0.02  0.94  0.05 
L  Wearing apparel  1980  1.00   0.01        SC  Industrial chemicals  1980 ￿0.48   0.01       
     1990  1.26  0.02  0.06        1990 0.13  0.00  0.37   
      1998  1.18   0.01  0.00 0.03       1998 0.42   0.01  0.05  0.32 
L  Leather products  1980  1.58***  0.04        SC  Other chemicals  1980 0.04   0.00       
     1990  1.76***  0.03  0.05        1990 ￿0.09  0.00  0.26   
      1998  1.85***  0.03  0.05 0.08       1998 0.33   0.00  0.17  0.01 
L  Footwear  1980  2.30**  0.07        SC  Rubber products  1980 0.75*  0.01       
     1990  2.77***  0.05  0.14        1990 0.17  0.00  0.81   
      1998  2.75***  0.04  0.00 0.09       1998 0.07   0.00  0.02  0.69 
R  Wood products  1980  0.87   0.01        SC  Plastic products  1980 0.22   0.00       
     1990  0.41  0.00  0.17        1990 ￿0.24  0.00  0.49   
      1998  0.21   0.00  0.20 0.27       1998 ￿0.08   0.00  0.05  0.08 
R  Furniture and fixtures  1980  0.34   0.00        SC  Iron & steel  1980 ￿0.93   0.01       
     1990  0.05  0.00  0.05        1990 0.34  0.00  1.32   
      1998  0.13   0.00  0.01 0.00       1998 0.41   0.00  0.01  0.68 
R  Paper & products  1980  ￿0.16   0.00        T  Non-electrical machinery  1980 ￿2.21***  0.07       
     1990  0.13  0.00  0.12        1990 ￿1.55**  0.04  1.36   
      1998  ￿0.13   0.00  0.14 0.00       1998 ￿1.79***  0.06  0.20  0.30 
R  Pottery, china etc.  1980  2.03***  0.06        T  Electrical machinery  1980 ￿0.75*  0.02       
     1990  2.09***  0.05  0.01        1990 ￿0.51  0.01  0.26   
      1998  1.68**  0.02  0.25 0.12       1998 ￿0.99***  0.02  0.95 0.13 
R  Glass & products  1980  0.37   0.00        T  Transport equipment  1980 ￿1.04***  0.04       
     1990  0.56*  0.01  0.02       1990 ￿1.64***  0.08  1.08     
      1998  0.99***  0.03  1.09 0.51       1998 ￿1.04**  0.02  0.52 0.02 
R  Non-metallic mineral products  1980  1.08***  0.03        T  Professional & scientific equipment  1980 ￿3.48***  0.08       
     1990  1.52***  0.07  0.53       1990 ￿3.60***  0.12  0.02     
      1998  1.49***  0.08  0.00 0.26       1998 ￿2.88***  0.10  0.59 0.16 
L  Fabricated metal products  1980  ￿0.37**  0.01        L  Other manufactured products  1980 ￿0.76*  0.01       
     1990  ￿0.14  0.00  0.29        1990 ￿0.90**  0.01  0.00   
      1998  0.07   0.00  0.09 0.25       1998 ￿1.15**  0.03  0.07  0.04 
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